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Abstract—Today’s security systems have been drawing great 
attentions as cryptographic algorithms have gained popularity 
due to the nature that make them suitable for use in constrained 
environment such as mobile sensor information applications, 
where computing resources and power availability are limited.  
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of them, which requires 
less computational power, communication bandwidth, and 
memory in comparison with other cryptosystem.  In particularly, 
in order to save pre-computing there is a trend for sensor 
networks to design a sensor-group-leader rather than every 
sensor node communicates to the end database, which indicated 
the needs to prevent from the man-in-the middle attacking.  In 
this paper we first present an algorithm that we called “hidden 
generation point” ECC protocol to protecting the ECC key 
exchange system from the man-in-middle attacking in wireless 
sensor networks. Even though there are other ways to be 
investigated, which will published in other paper, the major 
contribution in this paper is showing the hidden generation 
point” works. Also it is noted that the agent technology provides 
a method for handling increasing software complexity and 
supporting rapid and accurate decision making. A multi-agent 
applying for key exchange is motioned even the further discussed 
will be presented in another paper as the major task of this paper 
is presenting “hidden generation point.” 
Keywords- elliptic curve crytographic; public key; hiden 
generator point; man-in-middle attack. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 As the software applications have been permeating almost 
everywhere with ubiquitously computing, today's software 
applications are mainly characterized by their component-
based structures which are usually heterogeneous and 
distributed. Agent technology provides a method for handling 
increasing software complexity and supporting rapid and 
accurate decision making. A number of different approaches 
have emerged as candidates for the agent architecture, and at 
the same time, dozens of environments for modelling, testing 
and finally implementing agent-based systems have been 
developed [1]. Software agent has been developed [2] and it is 
a well-known MAS (multi-agent system) development kit 
supporting a world-wide agreed agent standard.  In this paper 
we are going to present MAS protect from wireless sensor 
network in ECC. 
Security in communication system has become increasingly 
prominent and its key technology cryptography technology 
develops rapidly. 
Wireless network has been experiencing an explosive 
growth in recent years and offering attractive flexibility to 
network operators and users. 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) has been known for 
public-key cryptography purposes [3], [4], which is 
independently introduced by Koblitz and Miller in 80’s has 
attracted increasing attention in recent years due to its linear 
scalability, a small software footprint, low hardware 
implementation cost, low bandwidth requirement, and high 
device performance.    
Normally the structure of an ECC operation involves three 
computational levels, namely scalar multiplication algorithm, 
point arithmetic and field arithmetic [5] mainly focus on 
improvements at the point arithmetic level to decreasing the 
time of ECC scalar multiplication.  For point adding, a 
combination of projective and affine coordinates, i.e. mixed 
addition [6], has offered the efficient formulae.   In the case of 
adding points in the same coordinate system, the required 
formula is more costly and is referred to as general addition.  
Recently, some approaches to compute faster scalar 
multiplications, such as double-base chain [7], ternary/binary 
method [6] have introduced tripling as a new point operation.  
Also there are many papers discussed the implementation over 
various situations [9]-[16].  Some of them raised different way 
to investigate the EEC such as multi-base system in ECC [17] 
and key exchange protocol in elliptic curve cryptography with 
no public point [10]. 
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end database as there is an effect way to save the storages for 
the “pre-computing data” in the sensor networks.  However, 
the algorithms related to this trend will inherently create chance 
for an attacker to make a “man-in-middle” attack, which is 
shown in Figure 1.   
Therefore there is necessary to think how to protect the 
networks from the attacks.  In this paper we are going to 
present two ways to protect the network from man-in-middle 
attacks based on hidden generator point over elliptic curve 
cryptography for public keys. 
The next section will discuss the general tradition elliptic 
curve cryptography with our focus that will be modified for our 
new protocols to protect the networks from the man-in-middle 
attacks.  After this section, the two ways based on the hidden 
generator point will be investigated, with which we can see 
either way will carry on the protection works while the process 
of ECC is on the way to completed.  The last section will give 
the conclusion of this paper.       
 
Figure 1:  Schematic diagram shows possible attack made by “man-in-
middle” in sensor network (in particular for the case with “group leader” 
communications.) 
II. TRADITIONAL ECC PROTOCOL 
An elliptic curve is the set of solutions of an equation of the 
form can be shown as below: 
edxcxxbyaxyy ????? 232   (1) 
where a, b, c, d, and e, are real numbers. 
A special addition operation is defined over elliptic curves 
and this with the inclusion of a point O, called point at infinity.  
If three points are on a line intersecting an elliptic curve, then 
their sum is equal to this point at infinity O, which acts as the 
identity element for this addition operation.  Sometimes the 
genera equation (1) can be referred as Weierstrass equation as 
shown in (2): 
baxxy ??32     (2) 
If we wanted use a elliptic curve to be used for 
cryptography the necessary condition is the curve is not 
singular, i.e. the discriminant of polynomial f(x) = x3 +ax +b : 
0274 23 ?? ba     (3) 
Figures 1 and 2 show the two elliptic curves are  
5232 ?? xxy     (4) 
and  
    (5) 12
32 ?xxy
We can see those two equations meet (3). 
 
Figure 2: Elliptic curves equation (4) 
An elliptic group over the Galois Field Ep(a,b) is obtained 
by computing x3 + ax + b mod p for 0 ? x < p.  The constant a 
and b are non negative integers smaller than the prime number 
p and as here we used “mod p”, so equation (3) should be read 
as: 
4a3 +27b2 mod p ? 0    (6) 
For each value of x one needs to determine whether or not it 
is a quadratic residue.  If it is the case, then there are two 
values in the elliptic group.  If not, then the point is not in the 
elliptic Ep(a,b) group. 
 
Figure 3: Elliptic curve equation (5) 
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When we fixed a prime number, p and then via the fixed 
constants a and b we have the Galois Field Ep(a,b) group. 
For example, let the points P =(x1, y1) and Q (x2,y2) be in 
the elliptic group Ep(a,b) group and O be the point at infinity.  
The rules for addition over the elliptic group Ep(a,b) are : 
(1) P+O = O + P = P 
(2) If x2 = x1 and y2 = -y1, that is P(x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) = 
(x1-y1) = -P, that is the case:  P+Q = O. 
(3) If Q ? –P, then their sum P+Q = (x3, y3) is given by ; 
pxxx  mod 21
2
3 ?  
pyxxy  mod )( 1313 ?   (7) 
where 
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The classical Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) 
scheme works as shown in the Figure 4. Initially Sensor Node 
A and Sensor Node B agree on a particular curve with base 
point P. They generate their public keys by multiplying P with 
their private keys namely KA and KB. After sharing public keys, 
they generate a shared secret key by multiplying public keys by 
their private keys.  The secret key is R = KA*KB*P. 
With the known values of QA, QB and P it is compu-
tationally intractable for an eavesdropper to calculate KA and 
KB which are the private keys of sensor node A and Sensor 
Node B. As a result, adversaries cannot figure out R which is 
the shared secret key. 
 
Figure 4:  Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol for WSN 
In order to express our new protocol of the hidden 
generator point we, without losing generality, we use an 
example for the above description.  Let’s have p = 23 and a = 1 
and b =1, i.e. the equation becomes: y2 = x3 +x +1 mod 23.  We 
have 4a3 +27b2 mod 23 = 8 ?0.  Now we need to determine if 
y2 is in the set of quadratic residues or not.  The calculation 
results are shown below for the elliptic group Ep(a,b) = E23 
(1,1) which includes the point (4, 0) corresponding to the single 
value y = 0. 
The elliptic curve cryptography can be used to encrypt 
plaintext messages, M, into ciphertexts.  The plaintext message 
M is encoded into a point PM from the finite set of points in 
the elliptic group, Ep(a,b).  First step consists in choosing a 
generator point, G? Ep(a,b), such that the smallest value of n 
for  which nG = O is a very large prime number.   Normally the 
traditional ECC protocol is let the elliptic group Ep(a,b) and the 
generator point G be in public.  The each user select a private 
key, say nA < n and compute the public key PA as PA = nAG.  
Then, encrypt the message point PM for the partner, say from 
Alice to Bob.  So Alice (A) chose a random integer k and 
computes the ciphertext pair of points PC using Bob’s public 
key PB: 
)](),[( BMC kPPkGP ?    (9) 
Bob received the ciphertext pair of points, PC then 
multiplies the first point, (kG) with his private key, nB, and then 
adds the result to the second point in the ciphertext pair of 
points as shown below: 
MBBM PkGnkPP ? )]([)(   (10) 
which is the plaintext point, corresponding to the plaintext 
message M.  It is noted that only Bob can obtain retrieve the 
plantext information PM by the private key nB.  The 
cryptographic strength of ECC lies in the difficulty for a 
cryptanalyst to determine the secret random number k from kP 
and P itself. The fast method to solve this problem is known as 
the elliptic curve logarithm problem (ECLP) [18]. 
III. PROPOSED PROTECTING FROM MAN-INMIDDLE 
ATTCKING IN ECC 
 It is clearly to see that ECC did not take care of the man-
in-the middle attacks even ECC itself has its cryptographic 
strength as described above.   
As above shown that the generator point G and elliptic 
group Ep(a,b) are in public.  Now let’s have a closer look at the 
elliptic group Ep(a,b).  In our above example, we pick the 
prime number p = 23 (it is noted that this is only for explaining 
the new protocol, in real life the p is bigger than this), we have 
quadratic residues group (p-1)/2 = 11 and for this group the 
Ep(a,b) can be shown as below: 
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
)18,19((19,5)
)16,13()7,13((12,19)
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)0,4((3,13)(3,10)
    
(18,20)(18,3))20,17()3,17(
(12,4)(11,20))3,11()16,9(
(6,19))4,6()19,5()4,5(
(1,16))7,1()22,0()1,0(
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      (11) 
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As we described in above that any point sitting in equation 
(3) can be appointed as generator point “G ,” in the traditional 
way (as in section II) the G is fixed and  let it be in public.  But 
now we are not going to do so.  As the generator is hidden, 
there is no way to know which point is generator therefore the 
attacker cannot make the “man-in-middle” attack.  Now we are 
going to show two ways to complete the ECC processing, 
namely (1) make protocol that has the common principle to 
work out the generator point, say from the distribution of 
elliptic  Ep(a,b) group; or by the new protocol to work out the 
PM as shown below.  
In order to make a common principle to work out the 
generator point for Alice and Bob, say we are going to use the 
distribution of elliptic  Ep(a,b) group, we need to check the 
what it looks like.  The equation (11) is shown in Figure 5. 
Distribution of Elliptic Group 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Elliptic Group E23(1,1). 
We now pick a generator point G by a character of the 
above distribution, say we pick the G when G (a, b)  ? Ep(a,b) 
with a = max {a} and b = max {b} (it is noted that other 
principle will apply).  In this example, G = (19, 18).  Note that 
we put a = max {a} first, so choosing it a = 19 then choose b = 
max {b}.  The order is important, in this case it is not the G = 
(18, 20). It is noted that there may have other ways to do the 
similar jobs as the discussed protocol did, for example we may 
make a “common agreement” for both sides that always take a 
particular point that is function of the distribution of Ep(a,b).  
Here, we highlighted the function of the elliptic group 
distribution is because it would be hard to broken in 
comparison of fixed point. When the generator point fixed we 
can have the following processing as described in section II.  In 
fact this way is more secure as the man (or women) has to do is 
decrypt the message from Bob re-encrypt it with Alice’s key 
and he can monitor the communication without detection.  This 
situation can be shown in Figure 6. 
As the G is not at the public, the attack cannot work out nG 
as traditional way does, so even the attacker can monitor the 
communication but no way to understand and attack the 
communications. The yellow one in Figure 6 does not work for 
the new protocol and the real line works with a protecting. 
 
 
Figure 6: A new protocol protecting the man-in-the-middle attack. 
This issue involves the user of a trusted “certificate 
authority” (CA).  When is queried the CA and returns a 
digitally signed “certificate” that can be compared to one that 
has been transmitted by another means.  In an authenticated 
key exchange based on the difficulty of the kth root problem 
was described in section II.  The way can be shown as Figure 
5. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Block diagram for hidden generator point principle. 
In Figure 7, the top plan is figure 5. When a generator is 
fixed by the distribution of the elliptic group then the P = kQ 
plan formed.  
Now let’s turn to the 2nd way, i.e., a new protocol to get the 
hidden generator point done. 
In the 2nd way, we need to face the case that Alice has no 
information about Bob’s public key as traditional way does.  
Therefore if Alice would like to send a message to Bob, Alice 
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cannot use public key to make cryptography to the message 
Alice wanted to send.  We may use, as an example, a protocol 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: A protocol for the ECC with hidden 
generator point. 
When Alice is going to send the message to Bob, Alice 
sends the pair of points PC (as shown (1) in the figure) as 
below:  
)](),[( 111 GnPnGnP AMAAC ?  
Here, n-1A meets the equation: unity = n-1A nA, we still 
called n-1A as private key for Alice but there is no need to worry 
about the public key as G is hidden at current situation.  So 
either PA or PB is not really useful in this case. When Bob 
received PC, he can operate as below: 
  GnGnPnPn AAMAMA
1111 ?
Then, Bob can make PD as below and sends it to Alice as 
shown the (2) in Figure 5. 
   MBAD PnnP
11
When Alice received PD, Alice can make PE and sent it to 
Bob as shown (3) in the Figure 5. 
  MBMBAADAE PnPnnnPnP
111 ))(()(
Then when Bob received PE, Bob can obtain the message 
related PM that sent from Alice by  
  MBBM PnnP
1
This can obtained only by Bob as no one has the private 
key that Bob has. 
It is clear that the first way discussed above is less 
computing calculation in comparison with the second way but 
it is need the “common principle” or “common protocol” 
before the communication.  If this common protocol is to be 
sent by communication network it will have a risk to be 
attacked or it will have to create a “safe way” to inform first 
then go ahead for the rest.  For the second way, it is obviously 
it takes more time than that in traditional way, which is the 
price to pay for protecting communications from the man-in-
middle attacks.    
IV. MULTIAGENT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECC 
PUBLIC KEY SYSTEM 
In the architecture, every agent is attached to a gateway 
federate. We can have several agents in a group attached to the 
same gateway federate or a single agent attached to a separate 
gateway federate. At the same time, different federates can also 
be put in the same machine or different machines. In order to 
enable agents to interact with their environment, we develop 
three interfaces to play the role of interaction channels between 
the federate and the agent, namely, a Rule Induction Agent, 
which is handling the ECC cryptography rule as described in 
section III, a Dynamic Analysis Agent, which is looking after 
related coding and decoding, and a User Interface Agent, 
which is dealing with interface processing. Both of them are 
transferred via the Object-to-Agent (O2A) communication 
channel provided by the agent toolkit. The framework of the 
multi-agent can be shown in Figure 9. Our work is concerned 
with the second area, namely to develop autonomous agents for 
representing entities in distributed simulations. 
A multi-agent system comprised of multiple autonomous 
components needs to have certain characteristics (Jennings, 
Sycara, & Wooldridge, 1998; Roberto, 1999): 
? each agent has incomplete capabilities to solve a 
problem; 
?  there is no global system control; 
? data is decentralized; and 
? computation is asynchronous. 
That is, combining multiple agents in a framework presents 
a useful software engineering paradigm where problem-solving 
components are described as individual agents pursuing high-
level goals. 
 
Figure 9: Multiagent framework for ECC 
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 It is noted that there are two ways, i.e. one is the date out 
and another is date in, so it is easily to communicate between 
two end systems, which is looking after by the agents. With 
multi-agent the whole system is more effective and efficiency 
for the ECC public key system, which will be discussed in 
other paper. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As security issue has been paid more attentions.  In recent 
years some cryptographic algorithms have obtained popularity 
due to properties that make them suitable for use in constrained 
environment such as mobile information appliances, sensor 
networks, where computing resources and power availability 
are limited.  Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of them.  
However, in the applications of ECC, in particular for the 
sensor networks there are always so-called man-in–middle 
attacks, in particular those networks are with very limited 
computing capacity and restricted power resources, which drew 
the researchers’ attractions.  In this paper we have presented 
two methods for protecting from man-in-middle attacks based 
on hidden generator point with ECC with multiagent system 
implementation. A effective and efficient system was designed 
and tested. 
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